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Abstract
Research Question To what extent does citizen-reported crime in 500-meter square
areas in Denmark, and arrests of individuals legally excluded from those areas for
intimidating behavior, decline in the 3-month time periods in which their Exclusion
Zone Orders (EZOs) are in effect, compared to the most recent 3-month period prior to
the EZO?
Data Individual-level data on 2441 arrests of the 161 offenders who were the subject of
all 218 EZOs granted in Denmark from 2009 through 2016 were collected from the
Danish National Police Database, as well as place-based reported crime data for the
location of each of the busiest 7 (out of 41) of the Exclusion Zones (EZs) and matched
control areas.
Methods The two units of analysis are individuals targeted by the EZOs and location of
the EZs. A descriptive time-series analysis compared offending before and individuals
received EZOs. Standardized mean differences were calculated between seven loca-
tions which received a high rate of EZOs and their matched control sites, all
distinguishing police-reported crimes from those reported by victims or witnesses.
Findings A moderate decrease in the number of citizen-reported offenses was observed
in six out of seven targeted zones when the EZOs were in effect. There was no
indication of a displacement effect to offenses outside the EZ.
Conclusions The positive results of this tracking study suggest that more rigorous
testing the use of EZOs across Denmark could demonstrate that EZOs can cause
reductions in crime and harm.
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Introduction
On June 12, 2009, the Danish government gave police a new legal power to combat
gang violence. Without the involvement of a court, police were empowered to issue an
“Exclusion Zone Order” (EZO) barring a named individual from a particular area for up
to 3 months at a time. Police were granted a limited authority to issue an EZO when
they could demonstrate that someone has acted in a particularly intimidating way,
creating fear in the specified local area (Justitsministeriet 18th of June 2009). The order
can also be renewed after 3 months, if there is still reason to believe that the person
would otherwise repeat the unwanted behavior within the exclusion zone (EZ).
The government justified the introduction of the EZO by a series of violent episodes
between gang-related groups involving the use of weapons. Some of the shootings led
to the tragic injuring and killing of innocent passers-by. According to the Government,
this created a situation that threatened everyday community life in the affected areas. As
part of this legislation, the EZOs were introduced as means to “provide the police with
an effective tool” (Justitsministeriet 2009), which also enabled them to conduct stop
and frisks in the designated Zones.
Initially, an individual’s breach of an EZO could be punished with a fine or
imprisonment for up to 6 months. However, in 2013 the Danish government, supported
by a majority of the Parliament, led a very visible campaign as a response to the gang
conflict escalating once again. Another series of legislative interventions were proposed
and adopted, among these an increase of the penalty for breaching the exclusion zone
order to a maximum imprisonment of 1.5 years (Justitsministeriet 2013, 2014). By
2017, the maximum exclusion zone size was expanded from 500 up to 1000 meters
(Justitsministeriet 2017).
Since 2009, five different Ministers of justice have recommended the use of the EZO
as an important and effective tool in what has been named by the media as “the fight
against gangs” as well as towards handling crime problems in vulnerable neighbor-
hoods. Despite the consistent policy support, there has been no research of whether the
EZO is effective in reducing the criminal behavior of the individuals subjected to them
or of lowering the crime level in the affected areas.
By the end of 2016, a total of 218 EZOs had been issued for a period of 3 months,
distributed across 161 unique individuals, 3 of whom are women. In Fig. 1, the
distribution of EZOs across time shows the number of granted EZOs peaked in 2013
with a total of 64 declined through the end of the study period.
This study provides the first tracking of the use of EZOs in Denmark, with a focus on
both individual and place-based crime trends. As an exercise in the “Targeting Testing and
Tracking” framework of evidence-based policing (Sherman 2013), this study is only a first
step towards rigorous testing of whether EZOs reduce crime and harm. The objective of
the study is only descriptive tracking of what police activity has been associated with these
areas and the people targeted, andwhether citizen-reported crime has declinedwhile EZOs
are in effect. These issues are addressed for both the individual persons subjected to the
orders, as well as for the seven areas subjected to the most EZOs. For individuals issued
one or more EZOs, the study tracks whether there is an observable decline in their arrests
within the EZs as well as elsewhere, during periods in which EZOs are in effect compared
to 3 months prior to EZOs being issued. The study also tracks whether the EZOs create
any observable displacement effect of victim-reported crime.
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Research Questions
To what extent does crime in places, or arrests of individuals, decline in the 3-month
time periods in which EZOs are in effect compared to the most recent 3-month period
prior to the EZO, and is there any evidence of displacement of crime by excluded
individuals to other locations?
Data
Two units of analysis form the basis of this study, using two separate datasets. One
dataset includes the individuals who have been subjected to one or more EZOs. The
other focuses on the locations of the EZs and their control areas.
In order to identify every single EZO ever granted inDenmark, all EZOswere extracted
from the national police records management system (POLSAS), and Control numbers
double checked in the National Police database. All Control numbers in which more than
one EZOwas registered under the same number were split up, so that in the end every row
matched one EZO and the individual subjected to it, during a period of at least 3 months.
Seven Control numbers where the EZO had been granted for less than 3 months were
excluded. In addition, 81 Control numbers were excluded because the registration in
POLSAS was either incorrect or inadequate. While 218 EZOs have been granted for
3 months across 161 unique offenders, only the first EZO for each offender is included in
the analysis.
Individual-Level Data
A search of all charges of the 161 individuals subjected to an EZO was conducted using
the POLMAP-Lite system, allowing a geographically defined search for specific crime
types by geo-mapping. The search was split into charges of crime committed inside the
Fig. 1 The number of EZOs issued in Denmark, between 2009 and 2016
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EZ and all charges of crime committed anywhere outside the EZ, for each individual’s
first EZO. Each individual was tracked through their unique social security number
(CPR), which enables a search for all police data related to this individual across all
police districts of Denmark. The data set created a descriptive analysis of the offending
histories over time of all 161 individuals subjected to an EZO. The search included
charges of crime committed 12 months prior to each EZO until the end of the 3 months
of the EZOs.
Charge information was gathered from 12 months before the first EZO was issued in
2009 until December 31, 2016 for all the individuals subjected to an EZO in all police
districts across Denmark. This allowed the analyses to include EZOs expiring at the end
of March 2017. The data was then sorted into charges per month relative to the issuance
date of each offender’s initial EZO.
The final individual-level dataset includes a total of 2441 criminal cases, in which
individuals subjected to one or more EZOs have been charged with crimes committed
inside or outside an EZ within a period of 12 months prior to the issuance date and the
3 months during the EZO.1 In all, 41 EZs were identified across Denmark, in which one
or more EZOs were granted between 2009 and 2017.
Place-Based Data
Among the 41 EZ locations identified with any EZOs, a subset of only 7 EZs was
identified in which multiple EZOs (three or more orders) had been issued for the exact
same period of time in the same location. A dataset of all reported crimes committed
inside these seven locations was constructed with the aid of the POLMAP-Lite system.
In all, a total of 27 individual EZOs were issued for the seven intervention study EZ
areas included in this study’s place-based tracking analysis.
For the place-based tracking data, the independent (output) variable is the aggregat-
ed police activity measures associated with several EZOs, measured as the time
between issuance and expiry in the seven targeted locations. The dependent (outcome)
variable is the number of citizen-reported crimes per month that occurred within the EZ
for 3 months before and 3 months during the EZOs.
The final place-based dataset includes the same crime categories of citizen-reported
and police-reported crimes as the individual-level dataset.
Recipients’ Share of Crime in EZs In addition to the dataset just described, a similar
dataset was constructed based on charges instead of reported crime. The purpose of this
dataset was to calculate the percentage of charges in the EZs that the individuals
subjected to the EZOs were responsible for. The reasoning behind this analysis is to
see if these individuals account for a noticeable share of the total crime in the area.
Intervention and Control Area Matching The study identified comparable control areas
with similar population characteristics and type to match each respective EZO location,
but where no EZOs were granted in the period of measurement.
1 The exclusion of Controls due to the incorrect registrations of Controls in the National Police Database
means that the number of EZOs reported and included in this study may not correspond with the official
numbers.
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Five out of the seven selected EZO areas are located within areas on the govern-
ment’s controversial, but officially designated, so-called Ghetto list2 of marginalized
residential areas, as displayed in Table 1. These “listed” areas roughly correspond with
the boundaries of the EZs, although the size of these five EZs does not correspond
exactly with the “officially” marginalized areas displayed in the table. Some of the EZs
make up only part of the marginalized residential areas (as is the case with Bøgeparken
and Hothers plads) while others comprise a somewhat larger area (such as
Gadehavegårdsvej). Table 2 provides descriptive characteristics of the EZs, such as
the population density and the sociodemographic factors.
Prior to any analysis of crime in this study, EZs were matched by qualitative
scanning with their closest corresponding Control Area (CA). This method of matching
helps ensure a relatively high degree of similarity between the treatment and control
areas in regard to the land use and characteristics of the people living or spending time
in those locations.
The remaining two EZs are characterized as, respectively, a busy central train station
(Banestrøget in Tåstrup) in the outskirts of the capital of Copenhagen and a busy night
club area (Skolegade in Esbjerg) in the fifth largest city of Denmark. These areas are
matchedwith similar types of areas, the main station in the second largest city Aarhus and
the night clubbing area of the fourth largest city Aalborg. The crime data of the control
areas were then extracted in the same way as in the EZs, with the aid of POLMAP-Lite,
enabling a geographically specific search, including an area of precisely 500 meters in
radius. All intervention and control areas have the exact same geographic size.
Tracking Police-Reported Crime as an Output Variable of the EZOs
Not all crimes are suited to measure crime trends because some of them are heavily
dependent on police presence to be reported. These offense types are sometimes
referred to as police-initiated, because they are usually reported by police officers
themselves on random or targeted patrol as well as responding to specific calls for
service (Sherman and Weisburd 1995). This applies to most reports on drug dealing,
possession of arms, threatening an officer, public disorder offenses, and more. Because
the level of police-reported crimes is affected by the level of police presence, changes in
the level of police-reported crimes cannot be used as an indicator of whether the EZOs
have any impact on the crime levels of individual offenders or locations. If measuring
changes in the level of crimes such as drug and weapon offenses over time, the level of
police presence could act as a spurious variable, affecting the level of reported crimes in
one or the other direction (De Vaus 2001).
Instead, this study uses police-reported crimes as an output variable, indicative of
police presence. However, a rise in police-reported crime can be related to both
increased police presence as well as a number of other factors, such as a rise in the
number of motivated offenders or in the number of suitable targets. With this in mind,
the police-reported crimes are examined as a crude measure of police presence and
enforcement outputs.
2 This is, in fact, the current official name of the annual list published by the Government. The name and the
criteria for being on the list are publicly debated every year on the grounds of stigmatizing language.
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Measuring Citizen-Reported Crime Trends as Outcomes Across Time and Locations
The indicator of the outcome crime level is crime reported by citizens, typically
victims, their relatives, or witnesses. For the purpose of measuring crime trends
committed by individuals and in locations subjected to the EZOs, these citizen-
reported crimes were separated from the police-reported crimes. The citizen-reported
category primarily consists of theft offenses, burglary, robbery, bribery, fraud, sexual
offenses, vandalism, threats, violence, and homicides and will be measured and tested
as the dependent variable.
Targeted Individual Arrests and Time at Risk A crucial element of the individual
analysis is taking into account that some of those individuals subjected to the
EZOs might be in custody for shorter or longer periods of time before and during
the EZO. In his time-series analysis on gang injunctions, Carr et al. (2017)
Table 1 the final list of intervention and control areas included in the study
Exclusion zone/intervention area Name Control area Name
Banestrøget EZ1 Banegårdspladsen CA1
Gadehavegårdsvej EZ2 Skovparken CA2
Karlemosevej EZ3 Æblehaven CA3
Hothers Plads EZ4 Finlandsvej 2 CA4
Mjølnerparken EZ5 Finlandsvej 1 CA5
Bøgeparken EZ6 Gudrunsvej CA6
Skolegade EZ7 Jomfru Ane Gade CA7
Table 2 Characteristics of the treatment and control areas
Name of EZ or
control area (CA)
Population
size
Employed
outside
local labor
market
Immigrants
first- or
second
generation
Convicted Primary
school
education
only
Below
mean
income
(1000+)
2016
> 40%
2014–2015
> 50%
2016
> 2.7%
2014–2015
> 50%
2016
< 55%
2014
EZ2: Gadehavegård 2153 42.0 57.3 2.5 59.6 56.1
CA2: Skovparken, Kolding 2540 41.8 62.6 2.4 57.0 61.2
EZ3: Karlemose Parken 1488 40.7 52.7 1.9 53.5 66.6
CA3: Æblehaven, Roskilde 1494 41.3 43.8 3.3 54.4 63.5
EZ4 and 5: Mjølnerparken
(Hothers Plads)
1790 43.9 82.6 2.6 53.7 51.3
CA4 and 5: Finlandsparken,
Vejle
1635 43.9 71.1 2.0 56.1 64.1
EZ6: Vollsmose (Bøgeparken) 9238 51.2 68.0 3.2 57.8 57.1
CA6: Gjellerupparken,
Aarhus
6097 52.0 80.8 4.0 59.2 55.7
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discovered that the cohort included in his analysis on average spent 6% of their
time in custody before the gang injunction, whereas they spent an average of 14%
of their time in custody after the injunctions. A failure to adjust for time spent in
custody could then lead to an under-estimation of reoffending and lead to the
wrong conclusions (Ferante et al. 2009; Carr et al. 2017). On this basis, the
average days at risk per month has therefore been calculated and compared for
the included period of time before issuance as well as beyond. However, in
contrast with Carr et al. (2017), the data in this study shows no difference in time
spent in custody before and after the intervention. When calculating the time at
liberty for the individuals included in the study cases, they have 26.1 days per
month at risk before and 26.4 at risk during the 3-month order. As a sensitivity
analysis, the individual-level analysis was carried through, both with and without
taking account of days at risk, displaying the same results either way.
Methods
The tracking analysis of police outputs includes several elements. The first is a
longitudinal study of the whole population of individuals subjected to an EZO
since police were empowered to issue such orders. Next, the presence of the police
in locations associated with the EZOs is explored through a graph displaying the
average number of police-reported crimes per month, committed by the EZO
subjects for a period of up to 12 months prior to the issuance and during the
EZOs. Breaches of the EZOs are examined as a separate category of police-
reported crimes to estimate police presence during the period in which the EZOs
are in effect. The police-reported crimes primarily include possessing and dealing
drugs, most traffic offenses, possession of arms, threats against police officers, and
public disorder.
Finally, to answer the main crime outcome question, several before and after
analyses are reported. These compute the standardized mean difference in crime across
the two time periods of before and after issuance of the EZO for any possible pattern of
change in arrests for citizen-reported crime associated with the issuance of EZOs. For
that purpose, the effect size of Cohen’s d and confidence intervals are calculated to test
the null-hypothesis of no difference between charges before and after the EZO in the
individual-level data analysis (Hinton 2004). In the place-based analysis, the treatment
and control areas are compared through a visual analysis of the difference between each
of the paired EZs and Controls, comparing citizen-reported crimes 3 months prior to the
issuance with the 3 months during the EZOs.
The design of this study does not allow any statements about causality between the
EZOs and citizen-reported crime trends, since it will not be possible to rule out all rival
explanations (Hagan 2014). Generally, a rigorous method such as a randomized
controlled trial is needed to enable such conclusive statements (Ruane 2005). However,
the descriptive time-series analysis and the difference-in-differences analysis give some
indication of the relationship between the EZOs and changes in the crime level over
time, particularly if these comparisons are repeated in a range of different locations and
contexts and produce similar results.
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Findings
Table 3 shows that some police districts have issued no EZOs (South Sealand and
Midwest Jutland) while Copenhagen has issued almost half of the total number of
EZOs. As the center of gang-related conflicts, Copenhagen has a large number of
EZOs. More than half of the EZOs issued in Copenhagen (53) are located in the
particular street of Jægersborggade, a street publicly known as a headquarters for gang-
related drug dealing. For reasons unknown to the authors, the Police of Copenhagen
suddenly stopped granting EZOs in 2014. Since then, the district of Copenhagen has
only granted two in 2015 and not any at all in 2016. This decrease in EZOs issued by
the police in Copenhagen is the main explanation for the total drop in the issuance of
EZOs. Table 3 also illustrates that only a few police districts have used the EZO
repeatedly over the years. Most of the districts have little experience in issuing EZOs.
Table 4 provides an overview of the reasons given by police Case Workers for
issuing EZOs. In 61 cases, the case worker has not stated why the EZO should be
issued; the text field only refers to the duration and location. In the remaining cases, one
or more reasons are given. On the basis of these reasons, each issuance is categorized
the descriptive analysis of reasons. In many cases, the case worker argued that the EZO
should be issued because of both organized and gang-related drug dealing as well as
intimidating behavior. In such cases all three reasons are registered, which is why the
total sum exceeds the total number of EZOs in the previous table.
Some individuals have been subjected to several EZOs. As displayed in Table 5, the
vast majority of individuals (129 out of 161) have only been subjected to one.
However, 19 have been the subject of two and 13 have been subjected to more than
two EZOs. The mean age of the recipients are 21.6 years, with a standard deviation of
5.6. The youngest is 15 and the oldest is 54 years of age.
Table 3 Distribution of EZOs across police districts between 2009 and 2016
Police district 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Bornholm 1 1 2
Fuhnen 3 8 17 4 2 34
Copenhagen 6 29 37 7 22 2 103
Midwest Sealand 16 1 17
West Sealand 3 18 5 26
North Sealand 12 6 18
South Sealand 0
South Jutland 2 3 5
Southeast Jutland 7 7
East Jutland 3 1 4
North Jutland 2 2
Midwest Jutland 0
Total 6 41 42 22 64 26 13 4 218
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Recipients’ Share of Charges in the Exclusion Zones
The following analysis indicates that in most EZs the recipients are present and criminally
active during the 3 months prior to issuance. The share of charges in an EZ attributable to
individuals who received an EZO varies as displayed in Table 6. On average, the
recipients of the EZOs account for 15.7% of the total charges in the areas they are
excluded from. In EZ1, the five recipients account for a total of 37% of all charges, and
43.3% of the police-reported crimes prior to their exclusion. However, in EZ5, the same
number of individuals only account for a total of 2.6% of all charges in the EZ.
On average, the calculation of the recipient’s total share of charges indicates that if
successful in excluding these individuals from at least some of the EZs, the EZOs could
have an observable impact on the crime level in those areas.
Place-Based Analysis of Police-Reported Crime as Outputs
Figure 2 illustrates the 12-month trend in the number of crimes reported by the police
per month in the EZs compared to the control areas. The graph displays how there have
been mixed trends over time in both treatment and control areas. Within the last
4 months before the issuance, the number of police-reported crimes in the EZs increases
by 108%, exceeding the level of police-reported crime in the controls. The last 2 months
prior to the EZO issuance, the number of offenses increases in both the treatment and
control areas and then decreases immediately after EZO issuance. It then rises again in
both groups of areas. These trends suggest that whatever effect the EZOs may have
Table 4 Reasons given by police case workers for EZO issuance (not mutually exclusive)
Police district Drug dealing Intimidating behavior Gang related No reason
Bornholm – 2 – –
Fuhnen – 34 – –
Copenhagen 10 10 53 39
Midwest Sealand – 14 17 –
West Sealand 7 22 4
North Sealand – – – 14
South Jutland – 2 3 2
Southeast Jutland – 7 – –
East Jutland – – – 4
North Jutland – – – 2
Total 17 91 77 61
Table 5 The distribution of EZOs by individuals
Number of EZOs Subjected to
8
Subjected to
5
Subjected to
4
Subjected to
3
Subjected to
2
Subjected to
1
Total
No. individuals 1 2 3 7 19 129 161
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had, it is not from a spurious relationship with an increase in police presence and
proactive enforcement.
Table 7 shows how the relative difference in four out of seven locations indicates a
greater reduction of police-reported crimes in the EZs compared to the Controls. The
average change in percent from 3 months before to 3 months after the issuance of the
EZOs, when all of the seven treatment and control groups are pooled, indicates 31%
fewer offenses in the EZs compared to the Controls.
Individual Breaches of EZ Orders A total of 60 recipients out of 161 have been caught
breaching an EZO for a total of 297 times. This means that 37% of all the recipients
Table 6 The EZO recipients share of total number of charges in the EZs, 3 months prior to the issuances
Location Number of
recipients in EZ
Recipients share
of citizen-reported
crime in %
Recipients share of
police-reported crime
in %
Recipients total
share of charges
in %
EZ1 5 30.0 43.3 37.0
EZ2 6 19.0 13.0 14.8
EZ3 4 2.6 28.6 10.8
EZ4 3 4.5 8.4 7.1
EZ5 5 2.5 2.7 2.6
EZ6 3 41.7 22.2 30.0
EZ7 3 9.2 5.2 7.4
Mean 4 15.6 17.6 15.7
Standard deviation 1.2 14.2 13.5 11.9
Fig. 2 The number of crimes reported by the police in all the EZs and Controls, 12 months prior to the
issuance of EZOs and 3 months during EZOs
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have breached one or more EZOs. Figure 3 below shows how the average number of
breaches per day decreases during the 3-month time period of the EZO.
Figure 3 reflects the fact that 59.3% of the breaches happen within the first month,
while 24.5% happen in the second month, and 16.3% of the breaches occur in the third
month of the EZOs. Just about 1/3 of the recipients have breached an EZO once and 10
have breached twice. Four recipients have been caught breaching more than 20 times.
One individual has been caught breaching 27 times - 13 times within the first month of
the EZO, 8 times the second and 6 times in the third month. Thus the majority (63%) of
the recipients are not caught breaching at all, while the number of breaches decline
within the 3-month time period of the EZO.
For the remaining sections of the analysis, these breaches are excluded from the
calculations and graphs.
Individual Time-Series Analysis of Police-Reported Crime
Figure 4 illustrates the changes over time of police-reported crimes committed by the
EZ recipients. All the calculations in this section were also conducted taking account of
days at risk, showing the same results. Figure 4 displays the average charges of
recipients per month inside the EZs. It shows an increase in police-reported offenses
starting 4 months prior to the EZ issuance. The last month before issuance, there is a
total of 165 police-reported offenses, whereas the first month of the EZO only has a
total of 92 offenses inside the EZ. There is an immediate decrease after the issuance
inside the EZs. The next section illustrates the changes over time of police-reported
crimes. All the calculations in this section were also conducted taking account of days
Table 7 Relative change in mean number of police-reported crimes, before and after issuance of EZO in
intervention (EZ) and control areas (CA)
Average offenses per
month before (standard
deviation in brackets)
Average offenses per
month after (standard
deviation in brackets)
Percentage
difference between
before and after
Absolute difference in
relative percent change
for EZs vs. Controls
EZ1 38 (18) 17 (6) − 55% − 42%
CA1 88 (16) 77 (9) − 13%
EZ2 40 (7) 28 (7) − 30% − 26%
CA2 25 (16) 24 (15) − 4%
EZ3 14 (4) 11 (6) − 21% − 203%
CA3 17 (5) 48 (20) + 182%
EZ4 140 (20) 107 (6) − 24% − 12%
CA4 17 (4) 15 (7) − 12%
EZ5 102 (39) 81 (2) − 21% + 32%
CA5 15 (1) 7 (2) − 53%
EZ6 27 (20) 43 (5) + 59% + 15%
CA6 34 (8) 49 (5) + 44%
EZ7 62 (16) 77 (13) + 24% + 20%
CA7 136 (31) 141 (27) + 4%
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at risk, showing the same results. Figure 5 displays the average charges of recipients per
month inside the EZs. It shows an increase in police-reported offenses starting 4 months
prior to the EZ issuance. The last month before issuance, there is a total of 165 police-
reported offenses, whereas the first month of the EZO only has a total of 92 offenses
inside the EZ. There is an immediate decrease after the issuance inside the EZs.
Fig. 4 Average charges of police-reported crimes per month against EZO subjects inside the EZs (Total crime
reports N = 823)
Fig. 3 The distribution of breaches during the 3 months of the EZO
Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2018) 2:164–180 175
Table 8 displays the calculation of the effect size of the difference between the
number of charges 3 months before compared to 3 months after the issuance inside the
EZs, indicates a small effect of d = − 0.236 (CI = − 0.392; − 0.079).
Figure 5 displays the average charges of EZO recipients per month anywhere
outside the EZs. It shows an increase in police-reported offenses prior to the issuance
similar to the trend inside the EZs, indicating that the police might be targeting these
offenders regardless of location until they impose the EZO, or—in reverse—may
decide to impose the EZO because of all the crimes they detect these individuals
committing.
Table 9 displays the results of calculating the effect size of the difference between
the number of charges filed against the EZO subjects for crime outside the EZO during
the 3 months before, compared to 3 months after, issuance of the EZOs. These findings
indicates a small effect of d = − 0.241 (CI = − 0.397; − 0.084). The findings provide
some evidence against a displacement hypothesis.
Fig. 5 Average charges of police-reported crimes per month by EZO subjects outside the EZs before and after
EZO is issued (Total N = 1056)
Table 8 Difference in police-reported crimes, 3 months before and the 3 months during the EZO inside the
EZs
Mean Standard deviation N Effect size Confidence interval (95%)
Before 0.71 1.74 316 d = − 0.236 − 0.392 − 0.079
After 0.40 0.66
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Tracking Outcome Analysis of Citizen-Reported Crime Inside the EZOs
The last sections of the results focus on the citizen-reported crimes as a measure of the
crime level in areas, because measuring these offenses is not dependent on police
presence or arrest actions against individuals.
The question is whether a decline in reported crime can be observed, within the 3-
month time periods in which EZOs are in effect compared to the most recent 3-month
period in which they were not in effect for those places.
In order to establish whether the seven target EZs have a greater change in the crime
level after the issuance, the relative change in percent in the EZs compared to the seven
control areas is calculated. Table 10 displays a calculation of the relative changes in
offenses when comparing the treatment and control areas. The calculation shows
whether the reduction in citizen-reported offenses is bigger in the treatment areas
compared to the control areas. In six out of seven Controls, the calculation of the
relative change in percent, of crimes reported by citizens, indicates a greater reduction
Table 9 Difference in the level of police-reported crimes, 3 months before and 3 months during the EZO
outside the EZs
Mean Standard deviation N Effect size Confidence interval (95%)
Before 0.738 1.087 316 d = − 0.241 − 0.397 − 0.084
After 0.515 0.731 316
Table 10 Relative change in mean number of citizen-reported crimes, before and after issuance of EZO in
treatment (EZ) and control areas (CA)
Average offenses per
month before EZO
(SD in brackets)
Average offenses
per month after EZO
(SD in brackets)
Relative percentage
difference between
3 months before and
3 months after EZO
Absolute difference of
relative percent change in
offense counts in EZs
compared to Controls
EZ1 49 (14) 49 (10) 0% − 2%
CA1 234 (40) 239 (34) + 2%
EZ2 51 (4) 38 (7) − 25% − 73%
CA2 42 (27) 62 (17) + 48%
EZ3 55 (5) 112 (45) + 104% 114%
CA3 29 (10) 26 (5) − 10%
EZ4 222 (35) 181 (45) − 18% − 21%
CA4 31 (19) 32 (2) + 3%
EZ5 200 (37) 212 (55) − 100% − 129%
CA5 24 (7) 31 (9) + 29%
EZ6 41 (18) 47 (7) + 15% − 1%
CA6 69 (15) 80 (14) + 16%
EZ7 90 (9) 110 (13) + 22% − 5%
CA7 183 (12) 232 (81) + 27%
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of crimes in the EZs compared to the Controls. The average decrease in the EZs
compared to the Controls is 17%.
Conclusions
In the place-based analysis of the citizen-reported crimes, there is a relative percentage
reduction in crime in six out of seven comparisons. The average number of citizen-
reported crimes is reduced by 17% when comparing the level of crime 3 months prior
to the 3-month time period during the EZOs.
Furthermore, the observation that 37% of the recipients are caught breaching in an
EZ once or more during the 3 months they are excluded indicates that the police are
present during the 3-month time period of the EZOs. This supports the claim that the
reduction in police-reported crimes is not simply due to a sudden absence of police in
the EZs after issuance of the EZOs.
This study finds no indications of displacement to any other areas in Denmark.
In contrast, there seem to be indications of a positive diffusion, by which citizen-
reported crime levels decrease inside the EZs, while police-reported crimes for
the people subject to EZOs go down both outside and inside the EZOs. This
finding is consistent with other studies concluding that diffusion of crime benefits
is generally more likely than crime displacement to accompany a reduction in
target area crime (Weisburd et al. 2016; Telep et al. 2014) even study displace-
ment and diffusion in large geographic units, such as all 12 police districts of
Denmark, and conclude that displacement of crime only occurs in a small
proportion of the included studies, and that diffusion is just as likely. The
Campbell systematic review on hot spots-policing by Braga et al. (2012) con-
cludes that focusing police efforts on high-activity crime places does not inevi-
tably lead to crime displacement, and crime control benefits may just as well
diffuse into the areas immediately surrounding the targeted locations (Braga et al.
2012).
Summary The findings indicate that the EZOs are followed by reduced crime in the
500-meter square areas targeted as EZs, though it may look as if the police need to
enforce their power through giving breaches before the full effect of the EZOs comes
into place. The rapid decline in the relatively large proportion of recipients caught
breaching within the first month may indicate that the perceived certainty of apprehen-
sion for breach could increase after an initial arrest.
Limitations and Policy Implications
The evidence in this study is generally supportive of the continued use of EZOs.
Nonetheless, the study has two major limitations. One limitation is that the study lacks
truly like-for-like control groups, in which EZO use is compared to not using it under
similar circumstances and in similar areas. One example of such a design is a matched
pair random assignment protocol.
A more important limitation is the lack of a crime harm index to translate the crime
counts into indicators of the total seriousness of harm from the crimes that EZOs may
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prevent. Since the powers were given to police for managing severe harm spikes, it is
appropriate to examine their effect on high-harm crimes, rather than counting crimes as
if they are all created equal in harm (Sherman et al. 2016). Even a replication of this
study converting the counting of citizen-reported crimes in the seven high-EZO target
areas into the Danish Crime Harm Index (Andersen & Muller-Johnson 2018) would be
an important further contribution.
More rigorous testing with more sensitive, harm-weighted outcome measures is
needed to make stronger conclusions regarding a causal effect of EZOs on different
types of crime—and whether the visible presence of the police is essential to ensure the
observed decrease in crime. The tracking analysis indicates that the EZOs reduce
citizen-reported crimes, such as burglary, theft, violence, and sexual offenses. While
testing with a stronger (randomized) assignment of control areas is needed to make
stronger claims, this study provides moderately strong tracking evidence that continued
use of EZOs can help to control sudden spikes in serious crime by known offenders in
small areas. Other countries considering such legislation can combine this evidence
with the even larger tracking effects of gang injunction orders in Merseyside (Carr et al.
2017) to consider legislating similar grants of limited police authority, as the renowned
police scholar Herman Goldstein (1977) suggested decades ago.
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